Going Home?
"Now you may go to East Tim or/' said the Indonesian official earnestly, "and see for yourself what the government has done there." President Suharto had recently signed the decree which, in January 1989, opened the disputed territory to foreign tourists after 13 years of enforced isolation.
We were sitting near the base of Mount Kelimutu, a volcano famous for its three coloured lakes, located on the beautiful island of Flores, north of Timor in the Indonesian archipelago.
The young m an 's com m ent was directed to w hat he had read of economic development in the former Portuguese colony. Little did he ap preciate the reality of Jakarta's rule in East Timor.
Shortly thereafter, traversing the hot dusty streets of East Timor's capital Dili, I was immediately struck by the pervading atmosphere of fear and ap prehension. Friends in West Timor had tacitly warned of the excessive 'security situation' in the neighbour ing territory. It became readily ap parent that, while the opening of East Tim or w as a ray of light for the Timorese, the dark history of Jakarta's invasion and occupation still cast a long shadow over the lives of the in digenous population and, curiously, over m any ordinary Indonesians themselves. A not uncom m on resp o n se from In donesians is that they are living in East Timor because of 'duty7 and there is a longing to leave the place at the earliest opportunity. Timorese under stand this attitude-hence the "Kapan Pulang?" campaign developed by the clandestine resistance as a form of op position. This campaign involved Tim orese co n sta n tly ask in g In donesians when they were going home. It had an unsettling effect, rein forcing the sense that the Indonesians were foreigners in what is supposed to be their "27th Province".
The 12 November pro-independence demonstration was one of a series of protests organised by the new genera tion of educated Timorese youth since the territory was opened in 1989. Jakarta had previously placed great faith in the strategy that controlled education and the effluxion of time would create a new generation of Timorese who would be "good In d o n e s ia n s ". The b od ies of the Timorese youth at the Santa Cruz cemetery symbolise the ineffective ness of this strategy. Xanana Gusmao, the leader of the East Timorese Resistance, in a lengthy in terview in September 1990 at his secret mountain headquarters, succinctly put forward his view of the colonial power's dilemma: The youngsters, both those born before the invasion and those since, are children of the people, they are not children of one people and children of another, they are not children of the transmigrants, they are children of these people who, under 400 years of Portuguese domination, always knew how to keep alive the patriotic con sciousness...The schools estab lished by the Indonesians deny them their own language, their own culture, their traditions, their way of seeing things. The Indonesians tried to impose on them a way of thinking which they know is not theirs, yet they receive a transference in terms of continuity, a trans ference of their Maubere iden tity and culture, customs and traditions. A Maubere goes to a school in the Bahasa language, where they teach another his tory, another way of seeing, another concept of life. Evi dently, a people which knows itself cannot be reduced, can not be subjected. They are a people which is conscious, which wants not to be alienated, and this is the case of the Timorese youth, and this is the fundamental problem of the war.
Indonesians may control most of the guns in East Tim or but the vast majority of the indigenous population remains sullen and resentful towards them. Jakarta's changing of the repres sion levers from 'hard' to 'soft' or back to 'hard' again will not substantively alter this reality. East Timor is Jakarta's 'Palestinian problem' and the prob lem will continue for as long as the Indonesian governm ent lacks the courage and will to recognise the failure of its forcible integration into the Republic of Indonesia.
International pressure is critical to this recognition which, it seems, will only occur after the key architects of the failed policy, Generals Suharto and Murdani, have departed from the political scene.
One of the greatest ironies of the Santa Cruz massacre is that ABRI has come under unprecedented scrutiny and criticism from within Indonesia itself. The Armed Forces that went into East Timor to crush the people's aspira tions for freedom and democracy now finds that those very same Timorese have caused ABRI to be subjected to the winds of democracy and reform, fluky though those winds may be.
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